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ABSTRACT 
Despite the consensus on the negative country-level implications of corruption, its 
consequences for firms are less understood. This study examines the effect of bribery on the 
innovative performance of firms in emerging markets, as reflected by new product 
introductions. I argue that bribery may help innovators in these markets to introduce new 
products by overcoming bureaucratic obstacles, compensating for the lack of kinship or 
political affiliations, and hedging against political risk. I also propose that the relationship 
between firm bribery and new product introduction will be negatively moderated (i.e., 
weakened) by the quality of the formal and informal institutions in place. Employing data from 
over 6,000 firms in 30 emerging markets and a wide range of empirical tests, my results support 
these hypotheses. These findings extend transaction costs economics by showing that 
bureaucratic obstacles and uncertainty can drive firms into illegal cost minimization strategies. 
Moreover, they augment institutional theory by expounding upon the ways that norms and 
informal practices moderate the efficiency of firm strategies in emerging markets. 
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GREASING THE WHEELS OF CHANGE: BRIBERY, INSTITUTIONS, AND NEW 
PRODUCT INTRODUCTIONS IN EMERGING MARKETS 
 
 
“Bureaucrats live for respect. East of the Balkans, that means a bribe.” 
Michael Westen in the TV-series Burn Notice (IMDb, 2017) 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The worldwide monetary effects of corruption are estimated at a staggering US$ 1.5 
trillion per year (Kaufman, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2009), roughly the size of Australia’s gross 
domestic product (GDP). In emerging markets, corruption remains a ubiquitous feature of 
doing business (Rose-Ackerman, 1998; Husted, 1999; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Olken, 2009; 
Jeong & Weiner, 2012), and the use of bribes by both domestic and foreign firms is frequently 
reported in the press1. Although the general consensus is that bribery has negative effects on a 
country (Mauro, 1995; Cuervo-Cazzura, 2008; Anokhin & Schultze, 2009; Asiedu & Freeman, 
2009), its implications for firms are still insufficiently understood (Galang, 2012; Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2016). Thus, while prior research has proposed several explanations for why firms 
engage in bribing (Svensson, 2003; Collins & Uhlenbruck, 2004; Martin, Cullen, Johnson, & 
Parboteeah, 2007; Spencer & Gomez, 2011), recent scholarly attention has been directed at 
examining its consequences for firm strategies (Lee & Weng, 2013; Birhanu, Gambardella & 
Valentini, 2016). In particular, innovating firms in emerging markets face more bribing 
pressure from corrupt public officials (Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2014) and 
often lack proper institutional support for their activities (Kotabe, Jiang, & Murray, 2017). Yet, 
relatively little is known about the impact of bribery on firm innovation and the institutional 
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contingencies of this relationship (James, Leiblein, & Lu, 2013; Mueller, Rosenbusch, & 
Bausch, 2013).  
 To address these questions, I investigate how bribing affects the innovative 
performance of firms in emerging markets, as reflected by their new product introductions 
(Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Bstieler, 2012; Wang & Cheng, 2015). Introduction of new products 
represents a central aspect of firms’ strategy (Nadkarni & Chen, 2014) that provides avenues 
to diversify and adapt to evolving markets (Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt, & Lyman, 1990) and 
determines their subsequent survival and success (Banbury & Mitchell, 1995; Chaney & 
Devinney, 1992). Integrating elements from transaction costs economics (TCE) and 
institutional theory, I propose that, in emerging markets, bribing will have a positive 
(“greasing”) effect on firms’ new product introductions by effectively reducing the transaction 
costs associated with these activities. In these environments, bribery may help innovators to 
deal with bureaucratic obstacles (Hadjimanolis, 1999;  D’Este, Iammarino, Savona, & von 
Tunzelmann., 2012), influence public officials’ decisions despite lacking favorable kinship or 
political affiliations (Leff, 1964; Bertrand et al., 2007), and hedge against political risks from 
adverse regime and legislative changes (Acemoglu & Verdier, 2000; Darendeli & Hill, 2016). 
Furthermore, I argue that the impact of bribes on new product introductions will be negatively 
moderated by the quality of existing institutions (de Vaal & Ebben, 2011). Thus, effective 
regulatory frameworks for controlling corruption (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Frederikson, 2014) 
and greater levels of societal trust (Hunt, 2004; Uslaner, 2004) will reduce the greasing ability 
of bribes for product introductions via formal (e.g., scrutiny, penalties, and bureaucrats’ ability 
to organize) and informal mechanisms (e.g., reputation, use of intermediaries, and non-
pecuniary interactions). 
These hypotheses are tested using data from more than 6,000 firms in 30 emerging 
markets in Central Asia and Eastern Europe that exhibit substantial heterogeneity in terms of 
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bribing practices (Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, Doh, & Eden, 2006), institutional quality (Meyer, 
Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009), and innovative potential (Krammer, 2009). The empirical 
analysis corrects for the endogeneity of bribing, and undertakes a wide range of robustness 
checks in terms of estimation techniques, alternate proxies and instruments, and testing of 
underlying mechanisms. Overall, the results support the idea of a propitious greasing in the 
case of new product introductions, but one that is contingent on the existing formal and 
informal settings. 
This study contributes to the extant literature in the following ways. First, it expands 
the growing body of work on the consequences of bribery (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; Lee & 
Weng, 2013; Birhanu et al., 2016) by suggesting that bribery can help firms in emerging 
markets with the introduction of their new products (Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2001; Daneels, 
2002). This insight extends TCE theory by identifying several factors (i.e., overcoming 
bureaucracy, hedging against political risk, and compensating for lack of kinship or political 
affiliation) that may drive firms to engage in such illegal transaction-cost minimization 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). In doing so, this work builds on previous evidence that innovating 
firms engage disproportionately in bribing activities (Ayyagari et al., 2014) by suggesting that 
these firms employ bribery to reduce transaction costs in these markets. Moreover, it augments 
recent evidence on the strategic use of bribes (Iriyama, Kishore, & Talukdar, 2016) in relation 
to a central ingredient of strategy (i.e., new product introductions), which has direct 
implications for cash-flows, legitimacy, and market position of firms (Schoonhoven et al., 
1990).  
Second, this study speaks to the importance of informal institutions in dealing with 
corruption. While prior work on the role of institutions has focused on formal tensions, such as 
home-host country legislative differences or the impact of global regulations (Cuervo-Cazzura, 
2006; Cuervo-Cazzura, 2008; Spencer & Gomez, 2011), this study implies that informal 
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institutions are complementary and equally important in inhibiting the efficiency of bribes. 
This finding advances institutional theory by expounding on the ways that social norms and 
practices moderate firms’ responses (Galang, 2012) and legitimacy (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016) 
regarding illegal practices. It also contributes to the TCE tenet by showing that transaction 
costs experienced are not uniform across all firms. Thus, as scholars theorize TCE, they must 
also consider the formal and informal contingencies of their research. 
Finally, this work advances our understanding of the drivers of successful product 
strategy. While most research in this area develops micro-specific explanations around the 
characteristics of products, firms, and technologies (Evanschitzky, Eisend, Calantone, & Jiang, 
2012; Nadkarni & Chen, 2014), this study answers recent calls to examine the impact of 
external environments on new product introductions (Bstieler, 2012), particularly in the context 
of emerging markets (Story, Boso, & Cadogan, 2015). By showing that the effectiveness of 
product strategy is moderated by the formal and informal settings in which firms operate, it 
underscores the complex role of institutions in relation to successful introduction of new 
products. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Bribery: Grease or sand to economic activities? 
 The economic effects of corruption have been a topic of debate for the last 50 years. 
Defined as an abuse of public power for private gain, corruption includes various actions of 
public officials to accept, solicit, or extort money for private benefits (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997). 
Among the different manifestations of corruption, bribery remains the most common one in 
practice (Svensson, 2003), usually in the form of small cash payments to low-ranking public 
officials to influence favorably or speed-up their actions (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). While 
scholars agree that the global monetary effects of bribes are significant (Kaufmann et al., 2009), 
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the question whether such payments are noxious across all economic activities and agents is 
still debated in the extant literature. 
One branch of literature depicts corruption as “sanding” (i.e., obstructing) all economic 
endeavors through additional costs (Fisman & Svensson, 2007), increased uncertainty (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1993), and inefficient public provisions (Rose-Ackerman, 1998). Prior studies 
support this conjecture and find negative effects on economic growth (Mauro, 1995), 
productivity (Asiedu & Freeman, 2009; de Rosa, Gooroochurn, & Gorg, 2010), trade (Dutt & 
Traca, 2010), foreign investments (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006), entrepreneurship (Anokhin & 
Schultze, 2009), and social development (Rose-Ackerman, 1998). In contrast, an opposite view 
in the literature argues for positive effects of corruption, especially in weak institutional 
settings (Meon & Weill, 2010; de Vaal & Ebben, 2011) where the costs of preventing it usually 
outweigh the benefits (Acemoglu & Verdier, 2000). According to this view, firms can utilize 
corruption (e.g., bribes) to overcome government ineffectiveness, excessive bureaucracy, and 
rigid legislation (Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968), therefore reducing inefficiency and improving 
the allocation of resources in these contexts (Nye, 1967; Lien, 1990). Building on these 
rationales, prior studies have provided empirical evidence for this “greasing” hypothesis in the 
case of economic growth (Mendez & Sepulveda, 2006), foreign investments (Egger & Winner, 
2005), and productivity (Méon & Weill, 2010). 
Albeit most studies have focused on the macro (i.e., country-level) effects of corruption, 
it is unlikely that firms are uniformly affected by this phenomenon (Galang, 2012). When 
facing rampant corruption, firms often recognize and strategically utilize that state of affairs to 
influence the decisions of public officials to their advantage (Wade, 1982). Specifically, firms 
take advantage of such high-risk/high-reward environments (Vial & Hanoteau, 2010; De Jong 
et al., 2012) by paying larger bribes and virtually ignoring the legal and societal provisions 
against such practices (Jeong & Weiner, 2012). Moreover, when corrupt practices become 
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institutionalized in a society, managers are more likely to pursue legitimacy by matching the 
societal expectations regarding such informal payments (Collins & Uhlenbruck, 2004). Hence, 
firms’ responses to corrupt practices differ significantly across countries, contingent on the 
existing institutional configurations, both at home and abroad (Spencer & Gomez, 2011). 
From this perspective, emerging markets provide a propitious environment for 
examining firms’ responses to corruption (Cuervo-Cazzura, 2016). Defined as economies 
progressing towards being advanced in terms of their markets, financial systems, and 
regulations (Mody, 2004), these countries are characterized by cumbersome regulatory 
business procedures (Meyer et al., 2009) and a high tolerance for corrupt practices (Ufere, 
Perelli, Boland, & Carlsson, 2012). A study by Transparency International (2012) using 
executive surveys highlights that emerging markets (e.g., Russia, China, Mexico, Indonesia, or 
Argentina) are at the forefront of bribing activities. The fact that bribing is a common practice 
in many of these countries is reflected also by the extent of corruption scandals covered in the 
press, and the involvement of both domestic and multinational firms in these activities (Spencer 
& Gomez, 2011; Lee & Weng, 2013). In these markets, government officials have numerous 
opportunities to misuse their public authority, given the low quality of their legal and judicial 
systems (Meyer et al., 2009) and the rapid changes in their political and economic systems 
(Martin et al., 2007). These factors have triggered deep shifts in the regulatory landscape and 
societal values in these markets, fueling further corrupt practices as a mundane solution for 
achieving legitimate goals (Asiedu & Freeman, 2009). 
 
Bribery and new product introductions 
 In today’s competitive marketplace, introducing a new product or service is an 
important strategic choice with clear implications for a firm’s performance (Banbury & 
Mitchell, 1995), survival (Schoonhoven et al., 1990), growth (Danneels, 2002), and 
technological advancement (Wang & Chen, 2015). Since most innovations do not influence 
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firm performance until they are actually launched in the market, new products represent an 
accurate reflection of the commercial value of a firm’s innovative activities (Katila & Ahuja, 
2002). Subsequently, new product introduction is a common proxy for firms’ innovative 
performance in the literature2 (Garcia & Calatone, 2002; Becheikh, Landry, & Amara, 2006; 
Mohnen & Hall, 2013), complementing other, alternative metrics for innovation, such as R&D 
investments, and scientific publications (Katila & Ahuja, 2002). 
 Introduction of new products is a risky endeavor given the high failure rates and large 
amounts of capital involved (Cooper, Edgett, & Kleinschmidt, 2002). While most of the 
literature focuses on exploring the micro-drivers (i.e., product newness, technological factors, 
firm characteristics, etc.) of successful new products (Evanschitzky et al., 2012), relatively little 
is known about the contingent effect of the external environment on their success (Bstieler, 
2012). Environments that are perceived by managers to be highly uncertain, due to 
unpredictability or their inability to understand and adapt to specific contextual changes, will 
affect negatively new product introductions (Wind & Mahajan, 1997; Li & Atuahene-Gima, 
2001). Thus, recent findings in the literature suggest that macro-contextual factors, such as 
cultural values (Evanschitzky et al., 2012) or institutional settings (Story et al., 2015), should 
be included in explanations of these product introduction decisions since these factors reflect 
salient challenges for both firms and managers (Bstieler, 2005). Furthermore, such 
contingencies have yet to be explored in the literature, particularly in relationship to new 
product introductions in an international (Lee, Wong, & Calatone, 2011) and emerging market 
context (Story et al., 2015). Answering these calls, I examine the effects of two salient 
contextual features of emerging markets (i.e., bribery and institutional quality) on a firm’s 
performance with respect to new product introductions.  
To theorize the effects of bribes on a firm’s new product introductions, I combine 
elements from transaction costs economics and institutional theory. On one hand, bribery can 
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be considered a transaction between two rational and opportunistic parties (i.e., the bribing firm 
and the corrupt bureaucrat) that results in a service being performed (legally or illegally) or a 
change in the contingencies (e.g., speed or likelihood of approval) surrounding this service 
(Husted, 1994). On the other hand, institutional theory stresses the importance of institutional 
characteristics for firm strategies in emerging economies (Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 
1996; Peng, Sunny, Pinkham, & Hao, 2009), including bribing activities (Spencer & Gomez, 
2011). Therefore, any examination of firm bribery should incorporate some institutional 
bearings since they are highly representative of bribing practices and their relative success (de 
Vaal & Ebben, 2011).  
There are several mechanisms through which bribes may facilitate new product 
introduction in emerging markets. First, bribes present a faster and less uncertain way to deal 
with bureaucratic obstacles and sub-par public services, thereby reducing the transaction costs 
associated with the deployment of new products. Many emerging markets have heavily 
regulated industries with excessive provisions and requirements (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanez, & Shleifer, 2002). As a result, innovating firms in these environments face 
numerous bureaucratic barriers in the form of approvals, permits, licenses, and certifications 
(Hadjimanolis, 1999; D’Este et al., 2012) which significantly deter their ability to introduce 
new products in a timely fashion (Chryssochoidis & Wong, 1998). Furthermore, while firms 
that do not bribe often face arbitrary penalties (e.g., delays, extra requirements, failures, poor 
service) imposed by corrupt bureaucrats, firms that pay them obtain approvals and licenses 
with relative ease (Bertrand et al., 2007; Hunt & Laszlo, 2012). Hence, in corrupt settings, 
bribery presents “a quicker, and perhaps more effective strategic instrument” (Luo, 2005: 141) 
through which firms get relief from the bureaucratic strain (Rose-Ackerman, 1998; Martin et 
al., 2007), and reduce the transaction costs associated with the introduction of their new 
products (Ahlin & Bose, 2007). 
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Second, for innovators in emerging markets, bribes provide access to the decision-
making process, which otherwise would be restricted to members of certain political and kin 
networks. The close and longstanding association between economic and political cliques in 
these countries has resulted in competitive interferences, which confer advantages only to those 
managers who have the “right” kinship, amity, or political affiliation (Leff, 1964). In turn, 
unaffiliated innovators are likely to face bureaucratic barriers and arbitrary penalties as a result 
of ill-conceived and cumbersome regulations (Galang, 2012). These obstacles drain resources 
and reduce the ability of these firms to successfully meet these regulatory provisions for new 
product introductions (Chryssochoidis & Wong, 1998). Under these auspices, bribes represent 
an attractive alternative to cut through the red tape and counteract the negative effects of 
cronyism, nepotism, and political favoritism (Kasuga, 2013) since they “enable an economic 
innovator to introduce his innovations before he has had time to establish himself politically” 
(Leff, 1964: 11). 
Third, bribes can help firms to forge strong ties with local bureaucrats, thus allowing 
firms to carry on their corporate activities, even in the face of major political changes 
(Darendeli & Hill, 2016). In many emerging markets, the predictability of governments’ 
behavior remains a major concern for firms, given the high frequency of regime changes and 
the incoherence of legislative efforts over time (Acemoglu & Verdier, 2000). In contrast, 
bureaucrats appear to be a “more or less stable group […] over decades”, a group that outlasts 
political regimes and is able to shield firms against a wide range of restrictions of regulatory, 
contractual, or financial nature (Darendeli & Hill, 2016). Introduction of new products is an 
auspicious conclusion of a long-term and risky process (Katila & Ahuja, 2002) in which 
innovators must overcome many challenges in terms of research, development, production, and 
testing before hitting the markets (Danneels, 2002). Given these significant sunk costs, firms 
seek to avoid costly delays to the deployment of their products (Chryssochoidis & Wong, 1998) 
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and are willing to pay for insurance (in the form of bribes) against any harmful interference in 
their operations (Leff, 1964; De Jong et al., 2012). While developing links with the current 
political elites delivers immediate benefits for firms seeking relief from bureaucracy (Li, Meng, 
Wang, & Zhou, 2008), in the long term, using bribery as a tool for building ties with bureaucrats 
provides firms with a more effective and complementary safeguard against future political 
changes (Darendeli & Hill, 2016) that might affect negatively their new product launches. 
In sum, I hypothesize that bribing confers tangible benefits to innovators looking to 
introduce new products by granting them access to the decision-making process, avoiding 
costly delays from bureaucratic queues and sub-par public services, and shielding them against 
political risk, which is endemic in many emerging markets. Hence: 
Hypothesis 1: Bribery will have a positive effect on firms’ new product introductions in 
emerging markets.  
 
The role of formal institutions 
According to institutional theory, firms need legitimacy (i.e., endorsement by relevant 
institutional actors) to thrive in different environments (North, 1990). Legitimacy can be 
acquired by conforming to various institutional pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983): 
coercive ones (from an established authority), normative ones (from societal values, beliefs, 
and norms), and mimetic ones (pressure to imitate the behavior of successful peers). 
Subsequently, the efficiency of various business practices of firms, including the use of bribes 
(Spencer & Gomez, 2011), is subject to existing institutional pressures in these markets (Hitt 
et al., 2000; Peng et al., 2009).  
The institutional environment can be broadly conceptualized across two dimensions 
(Meyer et. al., 2009). The formal component of institutions refers to codified rules (laws, 
regulations, policies) that govern the interactions between different economic agents (North, 
1990). Given the multitude of regulatory practices in a country, I focus on one institutional 
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aspect that is the most salient for bribery—namely, the legislative control of corruption. These 
laws and regulations are specifically designed to limit the use of public power for private gain, 
covering a wide range of illegal behavior from “petty” (i.e., frequent small payments for small 
favors) to “grand” (i.e., large sums of money for lucrative, sizeable projects) corruption cases 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Kaufmann et al., 2009).  
I argue that, in countries with weak formal regulatory control of corruption, bribes will 
be more successful in facilitating the deployment of new products. In these environments, weak 
regulations confer significant leeway to bureaucrats in the form of rewarding bribing firms with 
insights into the decision process (Leff, 1964), taking advantage of bureaucratic shortcuts 
(Kasuga, 2013), and offering autonomy from political interferences (Darendeli & Hill, 2016). 
Consequently, these advantages will facilitate a speedier, or at least timely, introduction of the 
firms’ new products. Moreover, mimetic pressures from high-performing firms towards their 
competitors will increase a bribe’s ability to deliver the sought-after gains by creating 
incentives for bureaucrats to organize and coordinate these informal transactions (Blackburn 
and Forgues-Puccio, 2009). As a result, bribery will become an increasingly efficient 
alternative for deploying new products vis-à-vis the regular institutional route, which is plagued 
by bureaucratic obstacles and arbitrary halts (Luo, 2005).  
Finally, as bureaucrats become increasingly specialized and proficient in distributing 
benefits and penalties across firms, bribery will become the norm for efficiently deploying new 
products in these markets. Therefore, institutions that are weak in their efforts to control 
corruption will enhance the ability of bribes to function as an efficient grease rather than as a 
dangerous and illegal practice (Ufere et al., 2012). Under such circumstances, bribes will 
function as a “tax” on firms’ innovative activities, with well-established routines (who to pay, 
when to pay, what to expect), rates (how much to pay) and organized networks of corrupt 
bureaucrats that will govern the timely introduction of new products.  
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In contrast, strong regulatory control of corruption will significantly reduce the ability 
of bribes to facilitate the introduction of new products since such control intensifies the 
crackdown on corrupt behavior (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). Coercive pressures will deter the 
ability of bribes to deliver benefits to innovators since public officials will face greater risks of 
being caught and harsher penalties for engaging in corrupt practices (Galang, 2012). As a result, 
the more regulatory scrutiny they face, the less proficient these officials will be in assisting 
bribing firms to cut through red tape, protect against political risk, or influence the decision-
making process (Kaufmann et al., 2009). Moreover, in high-quality regulatory environments, 
innovators will be more likely to develop an internal culture and organizational structure that 
will discourage bribery in order to avoid negative “legitimacy spillovers” from corruption 
scandals (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). In response, mimetic pressures will encourage more firms 
to denounce these practices for product introductions (Schoonhoven et al., 1990), thus reducing 
the payoffs and incentives for bureaucrats to collude and organize and effectively diminishing 
the ability of bribes to deliver the desired outcome (Blackburn & Forgues-Puccio, 2009). As 
bribes lose their ability to grease new products, the (bribe-free) institutional route becomes the 
accepted norm for introducing new products. Ultimately, stronger control of corruption allows 
firms to escape arbitrary regulatory barriers, access relevant information, and avoid any other 
discriminatory treatment, all without bribery. In this way, the connection between bribery and 
new product deployment will be weakened under stronger formal institutions. Hence: 
 Hypothesis 2: The quality of existing formal institutions will moderate negatively (i.e., 
weaken) the effect of bribery on firms’ new product introductions in emerging markets. 
 
The role of informal institutions 
The second institutional component is represented by informal or “softer” aspects, such 
as values, beliefs, and social norms that guide firms indirectly on how to pursue their goals 
(North, 1990). Corruption remains, at least on paper, illegal in all countries. Therefore, informal 
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institutions can significantly affect the efficiency of such practices, even in the presence of 
strong regulatory provisions (Ufere et al., 2012). From a multitude of institutional aspects, I 
focus on the level of societal trust as an informal element that is particularly relevant for 
bribery, both at the level of firms (Hunt, 2004) and the society as a whole (Uslaner, 2004). 
Trust is a belief in the honesty, integrity, and reliability of others and thus is an expression of 
adherence to a moral community, which lays the basis for cooperation between different actors 
in a society (Uslaner, 2002). Alongside religiosity, trust shapes the underlying culture of a 
country (Husted, 1999), in turn reducing transaction costs (Putnam, 1993), stimulating 
collaboration (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011), and sustaining economic performance (Algan & 
Cahuc, 2010). Incorporating these insights, I argue that social trust will negatively affect the 
ability of bribes to grease more new products in these markets. 
Greater levels of societal trust will reduce the ability of bribes to facilitate the 
introduction of new products in several ways. First, trustful societies endorse high moral 
standards and uphold legal behavior, thereby forcing corrupt bureaucrats and firms to preserve 
certain moral appearances by engaging in secrecy and participating only in a few carefully 
selected corrupt deals (Uslaner, 2004). Subsequently, this secrecy and selectivity reduce the 
usefulness of bribes as a generic alternative to the usual bureaucratic route by limiting the 
number of instances in which bribes are profitable for both bureaucrats and firms (Uslaner, 
1999). Second, normative and mimetic pressures in high-trust societies will reduce the scale 
and scope of bribing benefits by promoting other non-monetary strategies as societal-preferred 
alternatives. Thus, in these environments, quid pro quo mechanisms will be better suited for 
governing the relationships between firms and bureaucrats, thereby limiting the ability of 
monetary exchanges (i.e., bribes) to deliver the sought-after benefits (Hunt, 2004). Third, given 
the importance of reputation in high-trust environments (Roberts & Dowling, 2002), innovative 
firms will make use of third-party intermediaries rather than directly engaging in corrupt 
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transactions (Frederiksson, 2014). While this strategy will reduce the risk of legitimacy 
spillovers (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999) and stakeholder penalties (Karpoff, Lee, & Martin, 2014), 
it will also deter the effectiveness of bribes by increasing costs and raising the potential for 
information loss and delays (Drugov, Hamman, & Serra, 2014).  
Finally, a high level of societal trust will reduce the efficiency of bribes in greasing new 
products by undermining firms’ ability to tap knowledge from the national and regional 
“innovation systems” in which they are embedded (Lundvall, 2002; Krammer, 2015). While 
bribery may serve as a quicker alternative for capitalization of a firm’s new product innovation 
in the short term, its long-term performance hinges on accessing new knowledge from networks 
of collaborators and partners (Chryssochoidis & Wong, 1998) to develop and adapt new 
products (Harvey & Griffith, 2007). In high-trust societies, illicit behaviors like bribery will 
trigger adverse responses from other actors within these networks (e.g., refusal to collaborate 
or exchange knowledge), which will in turn have a negative impact on a firm’s innovativeness 
and, ultimately, offset the efficiency of bribery as grease for deployment of its new products.  
In contrast, low levels of societal trust will boost the effectiveness of bribes in 
facilitating more new product introductions. Many emerging markets are characterized by rapid 
urbanization, fast economic growth, and high fertility rates, constituting ideal “distrustful 
laboratories” for testing this conjecture (Hunt, 2004). In these societies, weaker moral standards 
will eliminate any risks for legitimacy spillovers or negative reputation effects, and bribery will 
openly become the norm for pursuing legitimate goals (Ufere et al., 2012), including the 
introduction of new, innovative products (Lederman, 2010). Bureaucrats in these environments 
will be able to demand informal payments directly (Frederiksson, 2014) and have more leeway 
in terms of rewarding or punishing firms (Gong, 1993; Bertrand et al., 2007), therefore 
increasing the effectiveness of bribery in delivering results to firms that employ it. Moreover, 
low levels of societal trust will mean that bureaucrats are more likely to bestow benefits on 
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firms in exchange for monetary payoffs as opposed to making non-monetary arrangements 
such as quid pro quo (Hunt, 2004), which the benefitting firm might not honor ex-post (i.e., 
once the benefit has been received). Finally, innovating firms in low-trust environments will 
be confronted with a sparse and incoherent national and regional system of innovation where 
cooperation and access to knowledge would be difficult (Chung, 2002). As a consequence, 
firms will rely heavily on internal efforts to develop new products, targeting almost exclusively 
domestic markets for their commercialization (Lederman, 2010), and therefore reinforce the 
importance of greasing local bureaucrats in exchange for a timely introduction of their new 
products (Luo, 2005). 
In light of all these arguments, the level of societal trust will effectively decrease the 
ability of bribes to facilitate more new products to be introduced. Accordingly, I hypothesize 
that: 
Hypothesis 3: The quality of existing informal institutions will moderate negatively 
(i.e., weaken) the effect of bribery on firms’ new product introductions in emerging 
markets. 
 
METHOD 
Data and Sample 
 To test these theoretical predictions, I employ firm-level data on new product 
introductions and bribery from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS IV), a joint initiative of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and 
the World Bank Group in 2009, which covers 30 emerging markets, including more advanced 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, transition economies from the Balkans and 
Central Asia, plus Turkey3. Compared to indicators based on experts’ assessments (e.g., 
Transparency International), this survey is conceptually more rigorous and less prone to 
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measurement biases (Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2010). BEEPS employs standardized survey 
instruments and a stratified sampling technique (at the level of the two-digit ISIC industry, firm 
size and geographic location) to yield data that is both representative and comparable across 
these countries. There is also a panel component of this dataset, yet the dimension and 
representativeness of the panel are insufficient for our analysis4. The BEEP survey comprises 
16 sections that cover firm activities, interaction with governmental officials and characteristics 
of the business environment. The respondents are business owners or top managers. My final 
sample, after removing missing observations, consists of 6,085 firms. Descriptive statistics are 
reported in Table 1, while an overview of all variables is provided in Table 5 (Appendix).  
Assessment of common method bias (CMB). Given the potential for CMB, I have 
taken several measures to ensure that this risk of CMB is significantly reduced. First, the design 
of the BEEPS survey provides several “procedural remedies” (Podsakoff et al., 2003) for this 
problem: (1) anonymity of responses both in terms of firm and interviewee’s identities; (2) a 
good separation of questions on innovative performance – Section O, page 15- and 
bribery/informal payments – Section J, page 29 -; (3) and indirect phrasing to “sensitive” 
questions such as bribing, which eliminate self-incrimination and strategic responses due to 
social desirability or expectations of others. Second, to complement these procedural remedies, 
I have performed several statistical tests to check for any systematic correlation between 
variables due to measurement method. Specifically, I have performed a Harman’s one-factor 
test using the variables in my model. The results of this analysis suggests that more than one 
factor are responsible for the variance in the considered variables, and moreover, that the first 
factor did not account for a significant portion of this variance5. Given the weak nature of the 
Harman’s test, I have also controlled for the effect of a single unmeasured latent method factor 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). In this test, a confirmatory factor analysis model is constructed such 
that all items are allowed to load on their theoretical factors (theoretical model), and another in 
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which they are also allowed to load on a latent common factor. When comparing our theoretical 
model (Chi2 =5244.3, d.f. = 36) with the one with the additional latent common factor 
(Chi2=5428.9; d.f.=54) the results suggest a better fit in the latter, less parsimonious model 
(∆Chi2 = 184.6, d.f. = 18, p < 0.00). Moreover, the latent common factor accounts for a very 
small portion (2.25 percent) of the total variance compared with other variables such as firm 
age (22.26 percent) or managerial experience (28.83 percent). In conclusion, the results of all 
these tests suggest that common method bias is not a pervasive problem in this study. 
Dependent variable. Data on new product introduction is obtained from the 
“Innovation” section of the BEEPS survey following the usual conventions in this literature 
(OECD 2005). Using the answers obtained from the question “In the last three years, has this 
establishment introduced new products or services?” the dependent variable (npint) is binary 
(1-“yes”; 0-“no”) with all missing observations and “don’t know” answers being dropped from 
the final sample.  
Independent variables. The BEEPS dataset provides a rich set of questions which 
capture various facets of corruption (i.e. frequencies, amounts, sources, and purposes). For this 
study, I focus mainly on the intensity of bribing, as a proxy for firm’s ability to meet its specific 
demand for bribes (Svensson, 2003). The variable measuring bribing at the firm level (bribe) 
comes from the question: “It is said that establishments are sometimes required to make gifts 
or informal payments to public officials to ‘get things done’ with regard to customs, taxes, 
licences, regulations, services etc. On average what percentage of total annual sales, or 
estimated total annual value, do establishments like this one pay in informal payments or gifts 
to public officials for this purpose?” Similar to other surveys on sensitive matters, these 
questions were phrased indirectly so that respondents do not implicate themselves in any 
wrongdoing and increase the truthfulness of their responses (Svensson, 2003). Therefore, the 
variable measures the percentage of sales devoted to bribing activities. In cases of firms that 
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have provided only the annual value of bribes, this amount was converted to percentage terms 
using their total sales value.  
 Given the nature of questions in BEEPS there is potential for a perception bias in these 
responses, as a result of differences in cultural norms, economic optimism, and degrees of 
political freedom across countries, which may influence the ratings and degree of criticism 
towards public officials (de Rosa et al., 2010)6. However, previous research has shown that 
there is no significant bias, as aggregated measures of corruption from surveys are statistically 
comparable to the other objective measures (Fries, Lysenko, & Polanec, 2003; Razafindrakoto 
& Roubaud, 2010). Moreover, compared to expert assessment and country-level measures, 
BEEPS unbundles this phenomenon, thereby allowing for more in-depth analyses of bribing 
heterogeneity across firms (Knack, 2007).  
 This important heterogeneity in terms of bribery is also present among the 30 emerging 
markets considered here, despite similar obstacles, such as the communist heritage and 
macroeconomic or institutional adjustments. Thus, Estonia, Slovenia and Georgia report the 
smallest average bribing rates across firms (0.07 to 0.12 percent of annual sales), while 
Albania, Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan have the highest (2.09 to 4.19 percent). In terms of 
subnational regions, some of the most intensive bribing regions are found in Tajikistan 
(Sogdiskaya and Dushanbe), and Kyrgyz Republic (Bishkek and Chui), while the majority of 
“low bribe” regions are in Central European countries (e.g., Transdanubia in Hungary, Louna-
Eesti in Estonia, or Severozapad in Czech Republic). The average bribe varies also across 
industries from 0.47 percent of annual sales for Textiles to 1.37 percent for Metals.  
 To capture the relevant institutional factors I follow Kostova (1999) and  focus on a 
couple of elements that are particularly salient to bribery. However, in the robustness checks 
discussed in the next subsection I employ more institutional proxies. Thus,  formal institutional 
quality is measured using the control of corruption index developed by Kaufmann et al. (2009). 
 
 
GREASING THE WHEELS  21 
 
 
This indicator ranges between -2.5 (low control) to 2.5 (high control) using information from 
expert polls and surveys of managers. To simplify the interpretation, I have rescaled the 
original index by adding 2.5. Thus, the new variable ranges from 0 to 5, with higher values 
indicating better laws and regulations for controlling corruption. Informal institutional aspects 
are captured using a widely used measure of societal trust derived from a question in the 2008 
round of the World Value Surveys (Inglehart 2004): “Generally speaking, would you say that 
most people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?” (Yes/No). 
Following prior studies, I compute my measure of informal institutional quality at the country 
level as the percentage of respondents in a country that have answered “Yes” to this question.  
Controls. To account for any idiosyncratic differences in terms of bribery and new 
product introductions across countries and industrial sectors, I employ fixed effects 
specifications (for industry and country) throughout these regressions. Moreover, I include 
several firm-specific controls for innovation proposed by prior studies, as follows. 
Firm size is commonly linked to innovation, as bigger firms are able to devote more 
resources to R&D, which result in more new products and processes. I measure size (size) as 
the number of permanent employees of the firm and include a dummy variable (R&D) for firms 
that have performed such activities over the past three years (Mansfield, 1965). Besides mass, 
experience is an important driver of firm innovative strategy (Hansen, 1992). Thus, age is 
calculated by subtracting the year when the firm was registered from the year of the survey and 
then transformed logarithmically. Furthermore, different governance modes impact firms’ 
value, profitability and strategy (Hitt et al., 1996). This literature reveals significant differences 
between private and state owned firms ( La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2002) as well 
as foreign and domestic ones (Girma, Gong, & Görg, 2009). To account for these effects I use 
a foreign dummy and a state dummy, which take a value of 1 if a firm has a majority foreign, 
and respectively state ownership (i.e. greater than 50 percent), and 0 otherwise. Recent studies 
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emphasize also the role of managerial assets for firm performance (Bloom & Van Reenen, 
2010), value creation, and efficiency (Holcomb, Holmes Jr., & Connelly, 2009). I control for 
managerial experience (manexp) by including the number of years the manager has been 
working in the industry. Likewise, high performing firms are more likely to both innovate more 
as a result of superior capabilities, and bribe more, as a result of greater financial availability 
(Svensson, 2003). Therefore, I include in all regressions a proxy for firm performance, 
computed as the log difference of firm sales less its labour costs. Further, the link between 
competition and innovation has received a lot of attention since the seminal work of 
Schumpeter (1938). Hence, I include a measure of competition to account for its potential 
effects on firm innovation (Aghion et al., 2009) capturing the pressure from domestic 
competitors on the decision to develop new products on a Likert scale (1-“not at all important” 
to 4 -“very important”). Moreover, given the strong complementarity between firm innovation 
and exports (Golovko & Valentini, 2011) I include a dummy (exporter) control for exporting 
firms. Finally, firms’ access to financial resources is critical for their innovative performance 
(Ayyagari et al., 2011). Finance is a dummy variable that equals 1 for firms that have a credit 
line from a private bank, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Estimation strategy and econometric issues 
 To estimate the impact of bribery on firm’s new product introductions, I follow 
previous studies (Lederman 2010) and use a probit model that fits appropriately the binary 
nature of the main dependent variable (npint): 
𝑛𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑓 = Φ{𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑓 + 𝛽2𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑐 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑐 + 𝛽4𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑐 ∗ 𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑓
+ 𝛽5𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑐 ∗ 𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑓 + 𝛼1𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑓 + 𝜆𝑠 + 𝜂𝑐 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟} 
Where npint is a dummy that equals 1 for any new products or services introduced in the past 
three years; Φ denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution; f, s, c index firms, sectors 
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and countries; controls include all the firm specifics detailed in the previous section; λs and ηc 
are the industry (sector) and respectively country fixed-effects. 
Estimating this equation through a simple logit or probit regression may lead to biased 
estimates of the betas, given the endogeneity issue between bribery and any measure of firm 
performance, including introduction of new products (Vial & Hanoteau, 2010). Corrupt 
bureaucrats establish taxes, administrative hurdles and delays to extort bribes in line with firms’ 
perceived capacity to pay them. The latter is reflected by firms’ current and expected assets, 
which also include profits from new products and services that are about to be launched. Thus, 
innovative firms are more likely to face bribing demands (Ayyagari et al., 2014), given their 
greater ability to pay, as perceived by bureaucrats (Svensson 2003). Bribes and innovative 
performance are jointly determined by a multitude of factors that are specific to various 
industries (e.g., technological maturity), countries (e.g., institutions, wealth) and geographic 
locations (e.g., industrial concentration, habits of local bureaucrats).  
To correct for this endogeneity bias, I follow Fisman & Svensson (2007) and instrument 
my firm-level measure of corruption (bribe) with the average bribe in a given sector-region-
country unit excluding the focal firm, obtained also from BEEPS. Regions are defined as 
subnational political-administrative units in a country. The underlying assumptions, confirmed 
by the data, are that sector-region-country bribing rates are highly correlated with individual 
firm bribes (correlation=0.488) but uncorrelated with firm innovative performance (correlation 
= 0.005). Thus, the proposed instrument is a valid determinant of firm bribes (F statistic of 
1901.27, p<0.0001) but does not affect firm’s propensity to innovate (F statistic 4.13, p<0.042). 
Moreover, using these average values for instrumentation mitigates also potential measurement 
errors associated with bribes, given firms’ reluctance to report such payments (Vial & 
Hanoteau, 2010). The null hypothesis that bribes are exogenous is also rejected empirically, as 
the values of the Wald exogeneity test are statistically significant across most specifications. 
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The Anderson-Rubin (AR) tests also report p-values with high significance, commonly at 1%, 
indicating that the weak instrument problem is not present in these estimations.  
Therefore, firm level bribes are treated as endogenous throughout all specifications, 
while the quality of formal and informal institutions is considered to be exogenous to the firm 
innovation (i.e., introduction of new products), since these variables are measured at country 
level, and therefore cannot be significantly influenced by the individual actions of any one firm. 
These conclusions are also supported by the results of the Wald tests. Finally, the relationship 
between bribery and our formal institutional proxy could suffer from endogeneity issues. 
Although from a theoretical perspective, prior literature has proposed a variety of alternative 
explanations (Svensson, 2003; Bertrand et al., 2007; Galang, 2012) that trump the effects of 
formal institutions, I also test it empirically using the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for 
endogeneity, as discussed in Wooldridge (2010)7. The results of this test (Residual = 0.07; 
Chi2(1) = 1.45; Prob > Chi2 = 0.23) fail to reject the null hypothesis that bribery is endogenous 
to our formal institutional moderator, namely the control of corruption laws and regulations.  
 
Empirical analysis and results 
 Table 1 presents correlations between main variables of interest. In most cases these 
are within acceptable limits. I also compute variance inflation factors (VIFs) for each model, 
with satisfactory results. Finally, to accommodate for the presence of group-wise 
heteroskedasticity, as indicated by exploratory plots of residuals against my measure of bribery, 
I employ robust standard errors in all estimations. The main results are reported in Table 2. 
Model 1 presents the benchmark regression with all the controls, confirming past 
insights from literature regarding the drivers of firm innovation. Thus, size and R&D 
investments, foreign ownership, access to finance, competition and exporting are all associated 
with greater probability of firms to introduce new products. Model 2 tests the effect of bribery 
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on firm product introductions. The coefficient of bribe is positive and significant at 1% and 
remains within this range throughout the rest of estimations, thus supporting my first 
hypothesis. The mean marginal effect of bribes computed using the margins command in Stata 
14.2 is 0.055 (z statistic=3.92; p<0.00), indicating that a one percent increase in bribes increases 
the probability of introducing new products by 0.06% highly significant. This magnitude is 
consistent with our conjecture that bribes grease more new products in the market, while the 
core determinants of these product innovations remain R&D investments (0.85), learning by 
exporting (0.26), foreign ownership (0.20) and access to financial resources (0.19). Models 3 
and 4 examine the moderating effect of institutional quality on the relationship between bribery 
and new product introductions. Since the two institutional variables chosen (i.e., control of 
corruption for formal aspects, and average societal trust for the informal ones) are both 
measured at the country-level, their direct effect on firm’s propensity to introduce new products 
is wiped-out by the use of country fixed-effects, as a more efficient way to control for 
unobserved cross-country heterogeneity (Models 1, 2 and 8). However, in order to show the 
direct effects of institutional features, I drop the country fixed effects. Both coefficients of the 
institutional variables are positive and significant, confirming previous findings of a positive 
effect of institutions on new product introduction (Models 3 through 7). More importantly, the 
coefficients of these interactions are both negative and significant regardless of specification, 
and in line with my hypotheses that formal and informal institutional quality makes bribing 
less effective in introducing new products in these markets.  
                                                            ------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 here  
------------------------- 
To get an overview of these effects, I have also plotted these interactions holding all 
other variables constant. Figure 1 shows that the efficiency of bribes in facilitating new product 
introductions is contingent on the quality of laws and regulations in place to deal with 
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corruption. In very effective (stronger) institutional environments (i.e., with well-established 
regulations for control of corruption) paying large bribes is less efficient than following the 
common bureaucratic route with negative impacts on the propensity to introduce new product 
innovations. Given that most firms (98%) in our sample declare bribes below 20 percent of 
their sales, the average probability to innovate decreases from 0.6 to 0.2. In turn, in less 
effective (weaker) regulatory regimes bribery presents similar benefits increasing a firm's 
chances for successful new product introduction. The majority of firms stand improve their 
chances from 0.6 to 0.8 contingent on their bribing strategy. These results confirm that bribing 
benefits are extremely sensitive to regulatory aspects, and stress the role of strong anti-
corruption legislation and enforcement as means to reduce the effectiveness of bribes in these 
markets. 
------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 here  
------------------------- 
Likewise, some interesting results emerge upon examining the effect of informal 
institutions on the relation between bribes and new product introductions (Figure 2). All else 
equal, going from no bribe to a very high bribe in an unreliable (low-trust) society roughly 
doubles firms’ probability to deploy new products in the market from 0.4 to 0.9. Oppositely, in 
countries with high levels of societal trust bribing is actually reducing innovator's chances of 
introducing products by a small margin (less than 0.02). However, given that 98 percent of firm 
bribe are under 30% of their sales the success differential between bribers and non-bribers is 
slightly smaller (0.1 to 0.2). 
 
Robustness tests 
 To check the robustness of these results, I perform several other estimations by: (1) 
including additional controls documented by prior literature to enable (or hinder) firm 
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innovation, (2) testing the hypotheses in various subsamples of the dataset, (3) employing 
different measures for the main variables of interest (new product introductions, bribery and 
institutions), (4) checking for selection-bias, (5) providing some empirical validation for the 
theoretical channels proposed in this paper, and (6) checking these results at more aggregated 
level of analysis. Most of these results are not reported here due to inherent space constraints, 
but are available upon request. 
Additional control variables. Past studies have proposed other drivers for firm 
innovation that were not included in my baseline specification. For instance, the availability of 
skilled labor (human capital) is commonly associated with superior innovative performance 
(Furman et al., 2002). Information technology (IT) infrastructure spurs the diffusion of 
technology across borders with positive effects on creation of novel products (Czernich et al., 
2011). Quality improvements and external sources of technologies, in the form of licensing 
agreements (Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2001; Krammer, 2014) or technological alliances 
with foreign partners (Krammer, 2016), also increase firm innovative performance. Finally, 
firms from emerging markets are much more dependent on public funding and government 
links for their innovative activities than counterparts in more advanced economies (Krammer, 
2009). Therefore, I control for all the above factors in additional regressions, namely adequate 
labor8 (i.e., availability of adequate workers), internet (i.e., broadband access), ISO quality 
accreditation, technological licensing, subsidies and state-owned. Throughout these 
estimations the coefficient of bribe remains positive and retains a high level of statistical 
significance, supporting my previous findings. 
Additional instruments. While the use of an average bribe at sector-region-country 
unit excluding the focal firm has been validated in prior literature (Svensson, 2003; Fisman & 
Svensson, 2007), group-level random shocks may still create, in theory, spurious correlation 
between individual firm’s bribes and peer averages (Angrist & Pischke, 2008). Therefore, to 
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test the robustness of these results, I have tried other instruments from BEEPS, which measure 
whether gifts or informal payments were expected by governmental officials in different 
contexts (e.g., to obtain an electrical connection, water connection, telephone connection, 
construction permits, import licenses, operating licenses, by tax inspectors, to obtain 
compulsory certifications, and permits for acquiring land). Although, in most of these cases, 
the sample size decreases significantly the positive effect of bribes instrumented by these 
variables remains, but it is significant only for requests of tax inspectors bribe and those for 
land permits. These two instruments pass also successfully the Anderson-Rubin test. 
Different subsamples. Next, running a number of additional estimations across 
different subsamples of the dataset yields similar results to those reported in Table 2. First, I 
eliminate all potentially not truthful responses (as judged by the survey administrators) and all 
non-registered enterprises (in total 88 observations). Second, I account for influential 
observations using Cook’s square distance. Observations for which this distance measure is 
greater than 4/N, where N is the number of observations were marked as outliers and excluded 
from estimations. Third, I check these effects across different groups of countries (CIS versus 
CEE) and firm size classes (small, medium and large). The positive effects of bribing on new 
product introduction are stronger for CIS countries, consistent with our third hypothesis 
regarding the moderating effect of institutional quality, while in terms of size, small and 
medium size firms (less than 50 employees) appear to gain the most from greasing. Finally, the 
problem of adverse selection for corruption is well-known in the case of public procurements, 
with public officials in these environments being more likely to reward vendors based on their 
bribes rather than the quality of their products (Auriol, 2006). To make sure that these results 
are not driven by adverse-selection, I re-run the analysis without firms with public procurement 
contracts (N=4,682) and results are robust to this change.  
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Different measures of product introduction, bribery and institutions. Further, I use 
different measures (proxies) for the two main variables of interest, namely bribery and new 
product introduction (Tables 3 and 4)9. First, I examine effects of bribes on sales from new 
products (as a proxy for commercial success, or quality of these new products) using a Tobit 
estimation (Model 9, Table 3) the coefficient is again positive and significant, suggesting that 
greasing confers tangible benefits to firms in terms of capitalizing their innovations. Next, I 
follow Ayyagari et al. (2011), and employ a rougher proxy (i.e., more incremental innovations) 
which equals 1 if a firm has upgraded an existing product over the past three years, and zero 
otherwise (Model 10, Table 4). Interestingly, when focusing on these product upgrades, the 
positive effects of bribing disappear, in accordance with my conjecture that bribes perform a 
necessary function of facilitating a faster access to markets for new innovative products, by 
circumventing the existing institutional bureaucracy that surround these procedures. The other 
estimations in Table 4 check different additional proxies for corruption obtained from the 
BEEPS survey, namely the percent of contract value paid to governmental officials to secure 
this contract (Model 11), or the frequency of bribes to insure a smooth relationship with 
customs (Model 12), courts (Model 13) and tax officers (Model 14).  These institutional 
frictions are among the most prevalent environmental factors impacting firms’ product 
innovation (Hadjimanolis, 1999). In all these instances, the coefficients of these bribing proxies 
are positive and highly statistically significant, reinforcing my previous conclusions. 
Similarly, there are many aspects that characterize institutions. Following prior work in 
this area (Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999) in the main analysis I have focused only 
on two such elements that are most salient for bribery. However, to check the robustness of my 
conclusions I have included a variety of other proxies for institutions. For informal aspects, I 
have used two variables: (1) the degree of tightness/looseness of a society (Gelfand et al., 2011) 
which has direct implications for enforcement of rules and tolerance for deviant behaviors, and 
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(2) Hofstede’s (1997) four core cultural dimensions – Individualism, Power Distance, 
Uncertainty Avoidance and Masculinity- which have been linked in the past with aggregated 
rates of corruption (Husted, 1999). Overall, the results are in line with my previous findings, 
especially in the case of Hofstede’s values where data is available for 9 countries in my sample, 
as opposed to 5 in the case of Gelfand et al. (2011) data. For formal institutions, I examine the 
effect of three measures of political accountability (i.e., governmental fractionalization, 
number of veto players and political polarization), which have been shown to be conducive of 
higher regulatory quality (Beck et al., 2001). The results using these three measures of formal 
institutions are robust and again, support the negative moderating effects on the relationship 
between bribes and new product introductions.  
Selection bias. Firms may self-select into bribing and this self-selection may bias our 
results. To check whether this is the case, I carry out additional estimations using a maximum-
likelihood Heckman probit (see Table 6, Appendix). This estimator models specifically firm’s 
decision to engage in bribery as a first stage (“selection”) equation, and then controls for this 
selection effect in the second stage (“outcome” equation) and examine the subsequent impact 
of bribery on new product introductions. These results confirm that selection bias in not a 
pertinent issue in the case of new product introductions, as the correlation coefficient between 
the two equations (Rho) remains insignificant throughout most specifications. The subsequent 
likelihood ratio tests fail to reject the null hypothesis, namely that the correlation between the 
two error terms equals zero. Lastly, the coefficient of bribes in the outcome equation remains 
positive and highly statistically significant across all these additional models. 
Validation of the proposed mechanisms. Finally, the Heckman analysis provides also 
an opportunity to test empirically some of the theoretical mechanisms proposed in this study. 
Following Birhanu et al. (2016), I employ reverse causal inferences, and explore correlations 
in the data with two proposed mechanisms for which data is available (bureaucratic obstacles; 
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political risk), against other alternative explanations for greasing (e.g., fend off competitors and 
consumer pressure, avoid paying public utilities and taxes). These results confirm that firms 
who face a greater bureaucratic burden, and are more wary of political instability are more 
likely to engage in bribery (Table 6, Appendix). The effects are robust to introduction of 
alternative explanations for strategic use of bribery in conjecture to new product introductions 
(i.e., pressures from competitors and customers, or illicit firm behaviors such as overdue 
payments for utilities and taxes). While this analysis cannot completely exclude other malign 
reasons for using bribery that are not captured by this data, it confirms some of the theoretical 
reasoning behind this study and calls for subsequent examinations of these mechanisms. 
Different levels of analysis. Much of the literature on corruption has been conducted 
at aggregated levels of analysis, usually the country-level, and a common finding among these 
studies is that corruption has negative (sanding) effects. To test this in the case of new products, 
I examine the relationship between average bribes paid (within a country, and then, within a 
region) and the average probability of firms to introduce new products in a country (Figure 3), 
respectively region (Figure 4). The simple correlation coefficient between average bribe and 
average new product probability is negative and highly significant, both at the level of the 
country (-0.27; p<0.00) and the region (-0.11; p<0.00). Similarly, simple regression results 
confirm that sanding might actually prevail when examining the same data at more aggregated 
levels of analysis, with regression highly significant coefficients for country level bribes (-0.05; 
p<0.04), and negative but insignificant coefficients for regional bribes (-0.01; p<0.54). Thus, 
while these results support the sanding consensus, at least at the country-level, they also suggest 
that “greasing” and “sanding” effects can occur simultaneously, contingent on the level of the 
analysis considered. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 3 and 4 here  
-------------------------------- 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 The consensus in the literature is that corruption is detrimental for a country, and its 
negative consequences are consistently found in relation to key economic indicators such as 
GDP growth, trade, productivity, or foreign direct investment (Cuervo-Cazzura, 2008; 
Anokhin & Schulze, 2009; Dutt & Traca, 2010). In contrast, there are significant gaps in our 
understanding of the consequences of bribing for firm strategies (Galang, 2012; Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2016), and in particular for innovative performance (Mueller et al., 2013). This study 
reveals that, in the context of emerging markets, firms’ bribery has positive (i.e., greasing) 
impact on their ability to introduce new products, but that this effect is contingent on the formal 
and informal pressures in these environments. Moreover, ancillary results suggest that greasing 
is a strategic response of firms to ensure a timely deployment of their new products in the face 
of bureaucratic hurdles and political risk.  
This study makes several important contributions. First, it contributes to the corruption 
literature by expanding the emerging scholarly work on the consequences and strategic uses of 
bribery. Researchers have only recently begun to explore the strategic responses of firms 
through bribery (Iriyama et al., 2016), so our understanding of its effects remains confined to 
several aspects, namely entry modes (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006), exports (Lee & Weng, 2013), 
and capital investment (Birhanu et al., 2016). In turn, I focus on a strategic aspect (i.e., 
introduction of new products) that is critically linked to firms’ long-term performance 
(Banbury & Mitchell, 1995; Schoonhoven et al., 1990; Wang & Chen, 2015) and show that 
bribery can positively influence firms’ ability to cash in on their product innovations 
(Chryssochoidis & Wong, 1998).  
While prior research shows that innovators are disproportionately affected by bribing 
demands as opposed to non-innovators (Ayyagari et al., 2014), my findings suggest that there 
are also benefits from bribing. Namely, bribes can help firms to circumvent bureaucracy (Luo, 
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2005), avoid political risks (Darendeli & Hill, 2016), and make up for a lack of favorable 
affiliations (Leff, 1964). Since bribery demands significant financial and managerial resources 
(Martin et al., 2007), firms employ it strategically (Spencer & Gomez, 2011; Iriyama et al., 
2016) to reduce the uncertainty, timing, and costs surrounding new product introductions in 
emerging markets, which are often characterized by heavy bureaucracy and a volatile political 
landscape (Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2001; Kotabe et al., 2017). As such, bribing provides an 
alternative option for reducing transaction costs, and it enables firms to evade their usual role 
of victims in the face of corruption (Galang, 2012). 
Second, and related to the above, I show that the effectiveness of bribery in greasing 
new products in these markets is contingent on the formal and informal institutional settings 
(North, 1990; Hunt, 2004). Prior studies have documented the impact of formal regulations on 
corruption by examining its impact on multinational firms (Spencer & Gomez, 2011) and 
foreign direct investments (Cuervo-Cazzura, 2006, 2008). Complementarily, I propose that 
informal institutions (i.e., levels of societal trust) are equally important in inhibiting bribing 
efficiency. Specifically, I show that bribing in high-trust societies will be less proficient in 
speeding up product introductions, given the prevalence of non-monetary mechanisms, 
reputation effects, and moral considerations (Hunt, 2004; Uslaner, 2004; Karpoff et al., 2014). 
Therefore, in addition to national and international regulatory provisions, informal mechanisms 
can also serve as effective tools in curbing the appeal of corrupt behaviors (Martin et al., 2007; 
Gelfand et al., 2011).  
Third, this study extends the product strategy literature. While prior work in this area 
has paid significant attention to micro-specific explanations of technological, financial, or 
organizational nature (Evanschitzky et al., 2012; Nadkarni & Chen, 2014), our understanding 
of the impact of external environments on a firm’s product strategy remains limited (Bstieler, 
2012). This issue is particularly salient in the context of emerging markets, which are often 
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marked by high uncertainty and volatility (Lee et al., 2011; Story et al., 2015). By evaluating 
the moderating effects of formal and informal institutions, this work answers recent calls to 
examine the impact of macro-contextual factors on new product strategies (Story et al., 2015). 
Moreover, it documents the importance of non-market strategies as a specific tool that 
managers in emerging markets can employ to reduce uncertainty, delays, and arbitrary 
penalties that affect their product introductions. 
In terms of practical implications, these findings inform both managers and 
policymakers on multiple fronts. Innovating firms can bribe strategically public officials to 
reduce cumbersome regulatory processes, eliminate biases from the decision process, and avoid 
disruptions to their activities, all with the final goal of speeding up and facilitating the 
introduction of their product innovations in these markets. While bribery may provide a 
second-best alternative for innovators to deal with bureaucracy and political volatility, it still 
represents a deadweight loss for societies as a whole. Considering the importance of new 
products for both firms and consumers, governments should focus on reducing the appeal of, 
and the opportunities for, greasing bribes by improving the existing system. This goal can be 
achieved through streamlining the existing legislative approvals for new products, increasing 
transparency surrounding these decisions, and facilitating non-discriminatory access to public 
resources for firms. Complementarily, raising public awareness about corruption and forcefully 
and impartially pursuing perpetrators could reverse, albeit slowly, the permissive socio-cultural 
norms that perpetuate bribery as an efficient grease in these markets. Therefore, significant 
formal and informal reforms are required to achieve better control of corruption and greater 
trust in the governmental apparatus. Implementing such reforms will decrease the strategic 
appeal of bribery compared to the normal institutional route. Finally, when managers in 
emerging markets are confronted with bureaucratic obstacles or political volatility, the results 
of this study can inform them about potential lucrative and strategic uses of petty bribes in 
 
 
GREASING THE WHEELS  35 
 
 
emerging markets. However, these benefits must always be weighed against the costs of bribing 
and its long-term negative externalities (e.g., reliance on bribes, reputation effects, and legal 
penalties). 
This work is not without limitations, which also provide several intriguing avenues for 
future research. First, besides the benign explanations theorized in this paper to support the 
greasing effect of bribing, alternative explanations via less reputable means (e.g., posing entry 
barriers to competitors, avoiding labor taxes, or relaxing safety standards and regulations) 
could explain how bribes may favor indirectly the performance of innovators in these markets. 
As much as the BEEPS data allows, the present work has been able to successfully exclude 
such alternate explanations by testing them empirically against the mechanisms envisioned in 
the paper. Nevertheless, future studies in this area may want to focus explicitly on uncovering 
and disentangling the effects of these two types of mechanisms (benign – e.g., compensate for 
lacking political affiliation, or malign – e.g., desire to stifle competition) on firm performance 
in emerging markets. Such investigations will help us understand comprehensively whether 
bribing is a strategic response or an investment for firms in this context. Subsequently, these 
lines of inquiry would be able to provide clearer policy recommendations regarding corruption 
and the areas (i.e., supply or demand) in which governmental efforts should be concentrated. 
Second, another potential explanation for these results is that the new product 
innovations introduced through greasing are of inferior quality than those introduced without. 
As a result, innovators may cut back on the quality of their products to compensate for the 
funds set aside for bribing activities. In such a scenario, we would expect to see a positive effect 
of bribing both at the firm-level and at more aggregated levels of analysis, as all innovators 
will choose to bribe and then compensate for these expenses by reducing the quality of their 
products. However, there are several reasons why this is likely not to be the case. Theoretically, 
bribing can only affect the introduction of a product (via timing or easiness of the process) but 
 
 
GREASING THE WHEELS  36 
 
 
not its subsequent market performance. The latter depends on market factors such as price, 
competitive position, quality, and features (Danneels, 2002; Katila & Ahuja, 2002), all of 
which cannot be altered through bribing. Empirically also, firm bribery has a positive effect 
also on the percentage of sales from these new products, suggesting that firms do not cut back 
on the quality despite greasing the bureaucrats. Moreover, the aggregated data shows a negative 
macro-effect of bribery on innovation, which contradicts the country-level predictions 
stemming from this quality-cutting scenario. 
Third, these results might be driven by adverse selection, which is known to be 
significant in the case of public procurements (Auriol, 2006). Put simply, corrupt public 
officials could be more likely to award contracts to innovators based on their bribes rather than 
the competitive position or product characteristics. To dismiss this alternative, I have shown in 
my robustness tests that the greasing effect holds, even after eliminating all firms with public 
procurement contracts from the analysis. This suggests that greasing is present also the case of 
commercially-viable products vetted through market mechanisms – for example, how 
innovative, good, cheap, and well-suited to a market, etc. the product really is when compared 
to those of its competitors (Danneels, 2002) – as opposed to goods and services that cater to 
public procurement contracts. Although these results provide some assurance that adverse 
selection is not an issue in this case, the abundance of anecdotal evidence regarding the sub-
standard features (e.g., Brazil’s difficult preparation for the FIFA World Cup 2014, Russia’s 
record $51 billion price tag for the 2014 Winter Olympics) or even dangerous properties of 
products in emerging markets (i.e., dangerous toys, melamine in milk powder in China) calls 
for deeper examinations of these issues. Potential areas for future research could examine the 
effects of transparency, procedural improvements, and accountability regarding the outcomes 
of public procurements in emerging markets. 
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Fourth, there are several data-related avenues for improvement. While numerous and 
diverse, the 30 economies considered in this study might not be representative of all emerging 
markets. Therefore, subsequent studies should aim for even greater diversity in terms of the 
number of countries covered, and see whether these results can be generalized to other 
emerging markets in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Moreover, the dominant cross-sectional 
nature of the BEEPS dataset prevents me from drawing any dynamic (i.e., across time) 
implications of bribing strategies. Although, in this case, it is unlikely for bribery to have any 
long-term effects on a firm’s new product introductions (most petty corruption payments are 
usually made for securing fast, case-specific benefits), future work in this area can confirm 
these conjectures empirically by employing large longitudinal datasets. Finally, although 
BEEPS stands out as one of the best sources of data for capturing firm-level corruption 
(Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2010), it still is susceptible to measurement issues (Svensson, 
2003). For instance, previous studies attest to the prevalence of corruption in these markets, 
documenting a downward bias in perception-based corruption measures due to informational 
asymmetries and respondents’ reticence (Olken, 2009; Kraay & Murrell, 2016). Quantifying 
these biases through more refined survey techniques, as well as explaining these differences 
both within and across countries could provide some fruitful lines of inquiry. 
Fifth, the results of my robustness tests present also several attractive opportunities for 
future contributions. For instance, preliminary evidence, although not very strong, indicates 
potential nonlinearities regarding the effect of bribes. Theoretically, this finding could be 
explained through decreasing returns for bribing, arbitrariness issues, or a mismatch between 
bureaucrats’ demand for bribes and the supply of bribes from firms. Further examinations, 
potentially in conjunction with firm strategies, may yield important insights into the complex 
outcomes of bribery. Similarly, the results of the Heckman selection analysis have opened up 
the black box of bribery, providing an initial glimpse into its underlying mechanisms. While, 
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in this case, the process of examining and vetting these mechanisms was subject to data 
restrictions, future research may want to employ primary data to ensure a clearer identification 
of such mechanisms. Finally, an interesting finding of this study is that greasing and sanding 
may actually co-exist in the case of new product introductions, depending on the level of 
analysis considered. Building on this idea, future studies may re-examine this hypothesis in the 
case of well-established economic outcomes, such as productivity, economic performance, or 
exports.  
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Figure 1 
The interaction between firm bribes and formal institutions (control of corruption) 
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Figure 2 
The interaction between firm bribes and informal institutions (societal trust) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
GREASING THE WHEELS  50 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
The average country-level effect of bribery on new product introduction 
 
 
Note: I plot the average firm bribes in a country against average propensity of firms in a country to introduce new products.  
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Figure 4 
The average region-level effect of bribery on new product introduction 
 
 
Note: I plot the average firm bribes in a region against average propensity of firms in a region to introduce new products.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
No. Variables Mean 
St. 
Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 npint 0.57 0.49 1.00            
2 bribe 0.65 3.05 0.04*** 1.00           
3 formal 1.79 0.57 0.01 -0.13*** 1.00          
4 informal 40.13 16.81 0.10*** -0.04** -0.25*** 1.00         
5 logsize 3.54 1.47 0.13*** -0.03* 0.00 -0.02 1.00        
6 logage 2.55 0.65 0.03* -0.03* 0.09*** -0.05*** 0.28*** 1.00       
7 foreign 0.08 0.27 0.07*** -0.02 0.09*** 0.04** 0.18*** -0.03* 1.00      
8 managexp 17.37 10.38 -0.04*** -0.03* 0.12*** -0.20*** 0.061*** 0.21*** -0.07*** 1.00     
9 competition 2.74 1.05 0.07*** -0.00 0.09*** 0.03** 0.00 0.04** -0.05*** 0.00 1.00    
10 exporter 0.26 0.44 0.13*** -0.04** 0.19*** -0.12*** 0.31*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.08*** -0.06*** 1.00   
11 R&D 0.28 0.45 0.30*** 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.23*** 0.10*** 0.04** 0.03* 0.01 0.19*** 1.00  
12 finance 0.53 0.50 0.13*** -0.02 0.14*** -0.11*** 0.23*** 0.07*** -0.02 0.02† 0.05*** 0.17*** 0.13*** 1.00 
13 stateowned 0.01 0.11 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06*** 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.10*** -0.03**  -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
14 firmperformance 15.85 3.62 0.13*** -0.04**  0.03*   0.12*** 0.44*** 0.08*** 0.13*** -0.02 0.01 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.16*** 
15 bribegov 2.19 7.68 0.03 0.39*** -0.16*** 0.01 -0.08** -0.06* 0.00 -0.07** 0.02 -0.05† 0.05† -0.03 
16 bribecustoms 1.52 1.07 0.08*** 0.23*** -0.23*** -0.04** 0.03* -0.02 0.01 -0.05*** 0.00 0.03* 0.04* 0.01 
17 bribecourts 1.44 0.98 0.04** 0.20*** -0.22*** -0.03* -0.02 -0.02* -0.02 -0.06*** 0.05*** -0.05*** 0.02 -0.01 
18 bribetax 1.61 1.09 0.03* 0.27*** -0.26*** -0.10*** -0.02† -0.04 -0.02 -0.07*** 0.08*** -0.08*** -0.01 -0.04*** 
19 bribery 0.23 0.42 0.04*** 0.40*** -0.19*** -0.13*** -0.01 -0.03* -0.02† -0.02*** 0.02 0.00 0.01* -0.01 
20 bureaucratic burden 13.14 21.43 0.00 0.06*** -0.03* -0.14*** 0.07*** 0.03 -0.02† 0.06*** 0.04** 0.03* 0.03 0.04*** 
21 no public resources 0.20 0.40 0.01 0.03 -0.07*** -0.13*** -0.00 0.01 -0.06*** -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.08*** 
22 political risk 1.99 1.45 0.01 0.08*** -0.13*** -0.07*** 0.00 -0.01 -0.03* 0.03 0.10*** -0.01 0.04** 0.02† 
23 foreign competition 2.09 1.14 0.11*** 0.01 0.15*** -0.08*** 0.18*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.03 0.24*** 0.29*** 0.19*** 0.10*** 
24 domestic competition 2.74 1.05 0.07*** -0.02 0.09*** 0.03** 0.00 0.04 -0.05*** 0.00 1.00*** -0.06*** 0.01 0.05*** 
25 consumer pressure 2.74 1.09 0.10*** -0.00 0.18*** -0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.02 0.04** 0.42*** 0.08*** 0.08* 0.07*** 
26 bad payer utilities 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.03* 0.01 0.04** -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.04* 
27 bad payer taxes 0.05 0.22 -0.02† 0.01 -0.02 -0.11*** -0.01 0.02† -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.03 
28 npsale 27.54 25.28 0.06*** 0.06*** -0.08 -0.03 -0.05** -0.07*** -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.04* -0.01 
29 upgrade 0.75 0.43 0.44*** 0.02 -0.01 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.02 0.06*** -0.05*** 0.05*** 0.10*** 0.23*** 0.10*** 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
Var. No. 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
13 1.00                
14 0.06*** 1.00               
15 -0.04 -0.03 1.00              
16 -0.02 0.04** 0.18*** 1.00             
17 -0.02 -0.02 0.19*** 0.59*** 1.00            
18 -0.02 0.00 0.25*** 0.58*** 0.63*** 1.00           
19 -0.04 -0.14 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.23*** 0.31*** 1.00          
20 0.01 0.06*** 0.09** 0.05*** 0.04** 0.03 0.12*** 1.00         
21 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.05*** 0.03* 0.04** 0.10*** 0.05*** 1.00        
22 -0.02 -0.04* 0.05† 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.11*** 0.12*** -0.00 1.00       
23 -0.01 0.06*** 0.01 0.08*** 0.03* 0.03* 0.04*** 0.04** 0.02 0.08*** 1.00      
24 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.02 0.04** -0.01 0.10*** 0.24*** 1.00     
25 -0.01 0.05*** -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.07*** 0.02† 0.07*** 0.32*** 0.42*** 1.00    
26 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.03* 0.02† 0.05*** 1.00   
27 0.01 -0.03* -0.02 0.04** 0.03 0.03 0.04** 0.04** 0.04*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.00 0.02 0.46*** 1.00  
28 -0.01 0.05** 0.03 0.03† 0.04 0.04 0.06*** 0.05 -0.01 0.05** 0.03† -0.04* -0.03† -0.02 0.03 1.00 
29 0.01 0.12*** -0.02 0.04* 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.09*** 0.05*** 0.05*** -0.03 -0.05*** 0.03† 
 
† p < 0.1 
* p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01 
*** p< 0.001. 
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Table 2 
Instrumental variable probit models 
 
 
DV:  New product introduction Model 1a Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
logsize 0.04* 0.04** 0.02 0.03† 0.02 0.03† 0.02 0.03 
 [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
logage -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 
 [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] 
foreign 0.19** 0.19** 0.17* 0.16* 0.17* 0.16* 0.15* 0.21** 
 [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.08] 
managexp -0.00 0.00 -0.01** -0.00† -0.01*** -0.00† -0.00 0.00 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
competition 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 
 [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.08] [0.02] 
exporter 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 
 [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06] 
R&D 0.86*** 0.85*** 0.85*** 0.85*** 0.85*** 0.86*** 0.87*** 0.88*** 
 [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.05] 
finance 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.25*** 0.23*** 
 [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.05] 
stateowned -0.35* -0.33* -0.17 -0.30† -0.16 -0.33** -0.31† -0.37* 
 [0.16] [0.16] [0.15] [0.16] [0.16] [0.16] [0.16] [0.18] 
firmperformance 0.01* 0.02* 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02* 0.01 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
bribe  0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.29* 0.20* 0.87* 1.54* 
  [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.14] [0.08] [0.38] [0.63] 
formal   0.07*  0.06*  0.13*  
   [0.03]  [0.03]  [0.06]  
informal    0.01***  0.01*** 0.01***  
    [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]  
bribe * formal     -0.17†  -0.34* -0.62* 
     [0.09]  [0.16] [0.26] 
bribe * informal      -0.00** -0.01* -0.01* 
      [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
constant -0.57* -0.65** -0.52** -0.89*** -0.60** -0.98*** -1.18*** -0.44 
 [0.24] [0.236] [0.196] [0.195] [0.211] [0.20] [0.247] [0.272] 
Industry  fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country  fixed effects Yes Yes No No No No No Yes 
N 6,085 6,085 6,085 6,085 6,085 6,085 6,085 6,085 
VIF 4.53 4.49 3.32 3.96 3.86 3.86 3.89 3.47 
LR Chi- Square 992.02 1036.89 830.31 877.04 815.96 867.80 829.14 861.23 
Wald Exogeneity test - 6.99*** 3.89* 3.88* 3.75* 3.99* 4.75** 7.08** 
Anderson-Rubin Chi- Square - 14.90*** 11.20*** 11.20*** 4.51* 6.50** 5.64** 7.66** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
Notes:  
a Model 1 is estimated using a simple probit given that the endogenous variable (bribe) is not included. 
† p < 0.1 
* p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01 
*** p< 0.001. 
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Table 3 
Tobit model.  
 
 
DV: Percent sales 
from new products 
Model 9 
logsize -0.70† 
 [0.37] 
logage -4.93*** 
 [0.68] 
foreign 1.02 
 [1.45] 
managexp -0.03 
 [0.04] 
competition 0.07*** 
 [0.02] 
exporter 0.44 
 [1.05] 
R&D 2.57** 
 [0.89] 
finance 0.94 
 [0.87] 
stateowned -1.80 
 [3.61] 
firmperformance 0.05 
 [0.17] 
constant 47.32*** 
 [5.35] 
bribe 0.23* 
 [0.11] 
Industry fixed effects Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes 
N 4,072 
VIF 5.1 
LR Chi Square 251.37 
Wald Exogeneity test 0.54 
 
 
† p < 0.1 
* p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01 
*** p< 0.001. 
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Table 4 
Additional instrumental variable probit models. 
 
 
DVb 
 
Model 10 
 
Model 11 
 
Model 12 
 
Model 13 
 
Model 14 
logsize 0.06*** 0.09† 0.03† 0.04* 0.03* 
 [0.02] [0.05] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
logage -0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
 [0.03] [0.07] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] 
foreign 0.17* 0.03 0.18* 0.24** 0.19** 
 [0.07] [0.21] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] 
managexp 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00† 
 [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
competition 0.09*** -0.00 0.06*** 0.03 0.04† 
  [0.02] [0.05] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] 
exporter 0.20*** 0.39** 0.16** 0.22*** 0.21*** 
 [0.05] [0.13] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] 
R&D 0.79*** 0.60*** 0.79*** 0.77*** 0.79*** 
 [0.05] [0.11] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] 
finance 0.14*** 0.18† 0.180*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 
 [0.04] [0.10] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] 
stateowned -0.23† -0.62** -0.06 -0.08 -0.17 
 [0.13] [0.29] [0.15] [0.15] [0.14] 
firmperformance 0.01† 0.01 0.01† 0.02* 0.02*** 
 [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
constant 0.31 0.27 -0.48 -0.43 -0.24 
 [0.30] [0.55] [0.30] [0.32] [0.27] 
bribe 0.01     
 [0.01]     
bribegov  0.12**    
  [0.04]    
bribecustoms   0.46***   
   [0.13]   
bribecourts    0.67***  
    [0.18]  
bribetax     0.41*** 
     [0.12] 
Industry  fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country  fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,665 1,560 6,788 6,778 7,121 
VIF 5.10 5.16 5.20 4.57 5.11 
LR Chi Square 1022.98 252.48 1080.66 974.60 1126.78 
Wald Exogeneity test 0.48 11.51*** 10.01*** 14.77*** 11.38*** 
Anderson-Rubin  Chi Square 0.41 12.41*** 13.17*** 16.19*** 13.90*** 
 
 
                                                          
Note: 
b For Model 10 the DV is whether the firm has upgraded its existing products, while for all other Models in the table the DV 
is new product introduction. 
† p < 0.1 
* p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01 
*** p< 0.001. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table 5 
 
Description of the variables  
 
 
Variable Description 
npint New product introduction (0/1) 
bribe Bribes as a percentage of annual sales of the firm 
formal Formal institutions - Control of corruption 
informal Informal institutions - Average level of trust 
logsize Logarithm of the number of employees 
logage Logarithm of firm age (2009 - year of establishment) 
foreign Majority foreign owned firms (0/1)  
managexp Managerial experience (years) 
competition Intensity of competition in domestic markets (0-4) 
exporter Exporting firm (0/1) 
R&D R&D performing firm (0/1) 
finance Existing finance from banks or lines of credit (0/1) 
stateowned Majority state-owned  firms (0/1) 
firmperformance Logarithm of the difference between firm sales and labour costs 
bribegov Bribe as a percentage of governmental contracts obtained 
bribecustoms Frequency payments to deal with customs (0-6) 
bribecourts Frequency payments to deal with courts (0-6) 
bribetax Frequency payments to deal with tax officers (0-6) 
bribery Whether the firm bribes or not (0/1) 
bureaucratic burden Time spent by the manager dealing with governmental regulations 
no public resources Infrastructure and credit are important obstacles for firm activities 
political risk Political instability is a severe obstacle for firm activities 
foreign competition Foreign competitors are important for new product innovation 
domestic competition Domestic competitors are important for new product innovation 
consumer pressure Consumer pressure is important for new product innovation 
bad payer utilities Firm has not paid utilities in more than 90 days 
bad payer taxes Firm has not paid taxes in more than 90 days 
npsale Percentage of firm's sales from new products and services 
upgrade Upgraded products and services (0/1) 
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Table 6 
Heckman probit models 
 
 
Variables /Models Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 
Outcome equation DV: New product introduction 
logsize 0.08** 0.09** 0.09** 0.07† 0.07† 0.07*  0.06** 0.07†   
 [0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.04] [0.03]    [0.03] [0.04]    
logage -0.15* -0.16* -0.16** -0.13† -0.13† -0.13†   -0.13† -0.14†   
 [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07]    [0.07] [0.07]    
foreign 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.19 
 [0.17] [0.17] [0.17] [0.16] [0.17] [0.17]    [0.16] [0.17]    
managexp 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01† 0.01† 0.01†   0.01† 0.01†   
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]    [0.00] [0.00]    
competition 0.08* 0.08* 0.08* 0.08* 0.07† 0.08*  0.08* 0.07†   
 [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]    [0.04] [0.04]    
exporter 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.10 
 [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10]    [0.10] [0.10]    
R&D 0.87*** 0.87*** 0.87*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.83*** 0.83*** 0.83*** 
 [0.10] [0.09] [0.09] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10]    [0.10] [0.10]    
finance 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.38*** 0.37*** 0.39*** 0.38*** 0.37*** 
 [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.09] [0.09]    [0.09] [0.09]    
stateowned -1.21* -1.21* -1.21* -1.17* -1.14* -1.16*  -1.17* -1.14*  
 [0.56] [0.56] [0.56] [0.55] [0.55] [0.55]    [0.58] [0.55]    
firmperformance 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
 [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]    [0.01] [0.01]    
bribe 0.04* 0.04* 0.04** 0.05** 0.04** 0.04**  0.05** 0.04+   
 [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]    [0.02] [0.02]    
Selection equation DV: Bribery 
lnsize 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
 [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02]    [0.01] [0.02]    
logage -0.07* -0.06* -0.06* -0.07* -0.08*** -0.07*  -0.07* -0.08*  
 [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]    [0.03] [0.03]    
firmperformance -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]    [0.01] [0.01]    
R&D 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 
 [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]    [0.04] [0.04]    
bureaucratic burden 0.01***   0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 [0.00]   [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]    [0.00] [0.00]    
no public resources  0.34***  0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 
  [0.04]  [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]    [0.04] [0.05]    
political risk   0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
   [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]    [0.01] [0.01]    
foreign competition     0.04*   0.04*  
     [0.02]   [0.02]    
domestic 
competition     
0.01 
  
0.01 
     [0.02]   [0.02]    
consumer pressure     -0.00   -0.00 
     [0.02]   [0.02]    
bad payer utilities      -0.16  -0.30** 
      [0.09]     [0.11]    
bad payer taxes       0.14† 0.27** 
       [0.08] [0.09]    
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Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AthRho -0.04 0.10 0.10 -0.23 -0.22 -0.26 -0.27 -0.25 
 [0.26] [0.32] [0.32] [0.20] [0.20] [0.20]    [0.20] [0.20]    
LR test (Rho=0) 0.03 0.10 0.43 1.38 1.17 1.66 1.83 1.66 
N 6,085 6,085 6,085 5,909 5,770 5,886 5,891 5,745 
Censored obs. 4,703 4,703 4,387 4,552 4,440 4,539 4,542 4,426 
Log Likelihood -3907.38 -3923.78 -3923.78 -3769.33 -3685.23 -3746.12 -3750.74 -3655.35 
LR Chi Square 256.08 237.02 237.02 246.56 238.45 243.88 243.9 236.02 
 
† p < 0.1 
* p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01 
*** p< 0.001. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1   Siemens, one of the world’s leading innovators, was found guilty of frequently using bribes 
abroad during the period from 2008 to 2010, and was fined a record US$1.6 billion in U.S. and 
European courts. Samsung’s heir, the billionaire Lee Jae-yong was just found guilty (August 
2017) of corruption and sentenced to five years in prison in a scandal that also led to the 
impeachment of former South Korean president Park Guen-hye. Avon’s CEO, Andrea Jung, 
had to step down and faced judicial action in 2012 as a result of a 2008 violation of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act. Major pharmaceutical companies like Pfizer, Astra Zeneca, Merck, 
Roche, Pharma Swiss, Actavis, and GlaxoSmithKline were all fined in 2012 for making 
payments to secure lucrative contracts in emerging markets such as Bulgaria, Croatia, Russia, 
and Kazakhstan. Finally, in 2012, Wal-Mart paid $24 million to fast-track its construction 
permits for new stores in Mexico. 
2 Formally, new product innovations are defined as goods or services that are new or 
significantly improved in terms of characteristics or intended uses (OECD, 2005). 
3 Given the overlap between these criteria, the only term that fits well all these economies is 
“emerging markets”. 
4 The BEEPS panel (over three rounds, i.e., 2002, 2005 and 2009) in the case of our 
specification has only 944 observations from 21 countries, raising significant doubts about the 
representativeness of this subsample for the overall population of firms in these economies. 
Further testing (t-tests, Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Kruskal–Wallis) confirms that the resulting 
panel of firms is not representative for the larger 2009 cross-section in terms of neither bribe, 
nor innovation.  
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5 For our entire model, I extracted four factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 (ranging from 
1.03 to 2.22) that account for 51.39 percent of the total variance (the first factor accounts for 
about 20 percent). 
6 Overall, 70% of the surveyed firms in BEEPS have answered the question regarding bribery, 
and the aggregate non-response rate is greater among innovators (29%) than non-innovating 
firms (14%) without controlling for firm- industry- specifics. The average non-response rate 
across countries regarding informal payments among firms is 30% with Albania having the 
highest (51%) and Hungary (6%) the lowest non-response rates to this question. 
7 This test has two stages: in the first one where I run an OLS regression with the hypothesized 
endogenous variable (bribery) as a function of control of corruption laws and regulations (i.e., 
the proposed instrument) plus a batch of controls (i.e., firm size, age and industry dummies). 
From this equation I generate predicted residuals, which are then inserted as additional 
regressors in the original probit estimation. Then I have tested the statistical significance of 
this residual using the Hausman test for which the null-hypothesis is that these residuals are 
zero and that therefore bribery is exogenous. 
8 I also test this using a skilled workers variable i.e., the percentage of workers with university 
degrees, with similar results. 
9 Results also hold when using a binary measure of bribes, or when including a squared term 
of bribe intensity which is jointly significant, but only at 10 percent, indicating potential non-
linear benefits from greasing. However, when controlling for quality of institutions (formal or 
informal) the significance of the square-term of bribes disappears. 
